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This thesis analyzes the development of the Asia-Pacific rebalance and its possible 
effects on United States naval strategy over the next several decades. The goal is to 
develop a better understanding of the Asian rebalance in order to improve future strategic 
choices governing the employment of the United States Navy in Asia. It argues that the 
Asia-Pacific rebalance and its effects continue to emphasize the importance of the U.S. 
Navy due to the increasing importance of U.S. economic, political and security interests 
regionally. In conjunction with increasing regional threats from China and North Korea, 
as well as non-traditional threats such as climate change or terrorism, the importance of 
U.S. naval presence and its interaction regionally will continue to be pivotal to future 
U.S. policy in the region. 
To accomplish this analysis it is necessary to describe the development of modern 
U.S. naval strategy, the historic involvement and role of the United States Navy in the 
Asia-Pacific and what the Navy has done substantively to integrate with the new strategy 
and how current policy choices can affect future U.S. naval objectives. Examining 
several different future scenarios and U.S. security policy goals in the Asia-Pacific, it will 
briefly look at costs and benefits of each situation with specific focus on the naval 
missions of conventional deterrence and the prevention of regional conflict as well as its 
impact on regional confidence building measures and the Navy’s ability to assist in 
humanitarian disaster-relief operations. 
It concludes that the United States Navy can continue to adapt to the desired 
policy goals as set forth by the Asia-Pacific rebalance. It can achieve success through an 
increased prioritization of resources to the Asia-Pacific, increased political sustainability 
of U.S. naval forward presence in the region, and to develop a new U.S. maritime 
strategy that reflects new geo-strategic realities. 
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U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to 
developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia 
into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving 
challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will 
continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance 
toward the Asia-Pacific region. 
—Defense Strategic Guidance, 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, January 2012 
 
This thesis analyzes the development of the Asia-Pacific rebalance and its 
possible effects on U.S. naval strategy over the next several decades. The goal is to better 
understand the Asian rebalance and U.S. policy goals in an effort to improve future 
strategic choices governing the employment of the United States Navy in Asia. 
The Asia-Pacific rebalance has had a significant impact on recent U.S. maritime 
strategy. How that rebalance will affect the future use of the U.S. Navy in diplomatic 
efforts is unclear, especially given financial concerns overshadowing the Navy’s presence 
in Asia. Regardless, the importance of the U.S. Navy in the Asia-Pacific region grows 
relative to the increasing size of regional navies and will remain a pivotal issue to U.S. 
foreign policy in Asia. 
This thesis will analyze what the Navy has done substantively to adapt to and 
implement the new strategy, and how current policy can affect future U.S. naval 
objectives. It will look at the costs and benefits of several future scenarios and U.S. 
security policy goals in the Asia-Pacific, focusing on conventional deterrence, regional 
confidence-building measures, and the Navy’s ability to assist in humanitarian disaster 
relief. 
A. THE ASIA-PACIFIC REBALANCE AND THE U.S. NAVY 
Navies are well suited to further the diplomatic aims of their governments. John 
Stuart Mill, the British political theorist stated, “Our diplomacy stands for nothing when 
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we have not a fleet to back it,”1 and this was shown through the role the British Navy 
played throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.2 The U.S. Navy has continued this 
tradition since the United States became the premier hegemonic power after World War 
II. Since then, it has repeatedly used its naval forces to strengthen its diplomatic 
endeavors globally.3 Examples of the use of the U.S. Navy in Asia over the past 75 years 
abound. Besides its use during the Korean and Vietnam wars, it has also been utilized to 
further various diplomatic aims throughout the region, such as the enforcement of 
Taiwanese independence, or to support regional allies or regimes through presence 
operations, exercises, or port visits.    
The rebalance began in the fall of 2011 when the Obama administration issued a 
series of announcements and took several steps to expand the focus of the United States 
in the Asia-Pacific. The declared rebalance identifies the Asia-Pacific as a geostrategic 
priority for the United States; thus, the administration made the attempt to demonstrate 
this reality with a shift in U.S. policy to the Asia-Pacific region.4 It goes without saying 
that the rebalance is not a re-engagement in a heretofore neglected region, but merely 
represents an increasing level of emphasis and priority that builds on pre-existing 
relationships, in the pursuit of established national interests. 
The Obama administration’s rebalance has undergone two distinct phases. When 
the policy was first rolled out in 2011, much of the emphasis was placed on military 
initiatives in the region. China saw these initiatives negatively and took aggressive steps 
to show its disapproval in forums throughout Asia as well as through various maritime 
disputes with U.S. allies. In 2012, the administration modified its approach downplaying 
its military initiatives, emphasizing instead economic and diplomatic elements while 
calling for closer engagement with China. They changed the new initiative from a “pivot” 
 1 Geoffrey Till, Seapower, A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 271. 
2 James Cable, Political Influence of Naval Force in History, (London, Macmillan Press, 1998). 
3 Till, Seapower, 20. 
4 Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, and Timothy J. A. Adamson, Balancing Acts: The U.S. 
Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, (Washington, DC: Elliot School of International Affairs, George 
Washington University, August 2013), 3–5. 
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to a “rebalance” of U.S. policy emphasizing its increasing engagement in the region.5 
This evolution is important because this shows that the policy is not static, but continues 
to evolve to reflect changing geopolitical realities both domestically and abroad.  
The past decade witnessed maritime disputes surrounding sovereignty over 
natural resources and various islands in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea, 
which have defined the security dialogue in the region.6 Figure 1 below shows some of 
the regional flashpoints that exist throughout the Asia-Pacific. The role that the United 
States Navy will play in addressing these disputes and maintaining regional stability 
throughout the Asia-Pacific within the framework of the new policy has yet to be 
thoroughly analyzed. Whatever political form the rebalance may take, however, the main 
effort in the military sphere will almost certainly fall on the Navy rather than the other 
service branches. This is due to navies’ ability to provide sustained forward presence and 
their wide versatility to engage in various situations while the army’s and air forces’ need 
for basing requires significant fixed infrastructure, thus, also needing constant host nation 
diplomatic support, which is not consistently available in the Asia-Pacific region due to 
geopolitical constraints.7 
5 Ibid., 6–7. 
 6 Michael A. McDevitt and Catherine K. Lea, CNA Maritime Asia Project: Naval Developments in 
Asia (Washington D.C: Center for Naval Analysis, 2012), accessed 26 August 2013. 
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/22412/cna_maritime_asia_project_workshop_two.html. 
7 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 14. 
 3 
                                                 
 
Figure 1.  Asia-Pacific Security Challenges8 
The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific appears to be reassuring to our allies in the 
region but worrisome to other countries, which take our shift in strategy as a mask for a 
policy aimed at the containment of China, an approach that has the potential to cause 
friction and eventual conflict.9 This is a simplistic explanation. The rebalance has been 
driven not by a security dilemma that China represents, but broad strategic, economic and 
political circumstances. The United States is thus is refocusing its attention on an area 
that it has been perceived as neglecting over the past several decades due to its 
8 Figure is a representation of regional flashpoints throughout the Asia Pacific. Figure taken from: U.S. 
Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment, (Washington, DC: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012), accessed 26 August, 2013, 14. 
http://csis.org/publication/pacom-force-posture-review. 
 9 Ibid., 13. 
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unprecedented and protracted commitment in the Middle East. As the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have ended, it is important for the U.S. to place additional emphasis 
on the Asia-Pacific because it represents a huge block of growing economic and strategic 
importance for the foreseeable future.10 Such a move is a rebalance in the precise sense 
that it restores an equilibrium that had once been taken for granted. 
This is not to say that China is not a primary concern for the United States’ 
policy. As the most populace country in the world with the largest military and the 
second largest economy, which continues to grow much more rapidly than its more 
developed counterparts, it does cause significant unease not only for the United States but 
for all of the countries throughout the Asia-Pacific. The rebalance can then be seen as 
reassurance for regional partners in the face of a stronger and more aggressive China. In 
addition, it has the dual effect of affirming, through policy decisions and the shift of 
economic, diplomatic and military resources to the region, that the U.S. is not retreating 
from the area, despite having fought exhaustive and expensive wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and despite difficult economic and political issues domestically. 
In summary, the goal of the U.S. is to increase its economic, security and political 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific with regional countries and institutions such as ASEAN, 
the EAS and the Shangri-La Dialogue while improving ties to its traditional allies and 
partners such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Australia including new powers such 
as China and India as well as smaller regional players such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam among others.11  
The lack of recent scholarship on the use of U.S. naval diplomacy for regional 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific is glaring, despite rising expenditure by regional states on 
their navies. As the U.S. Navy responds to the shift in strategic focus, its ability to effect 
and secure continued regional stability is of the utmost importance. Any possible 
aggravation of tensions in the region could lead to conflict that will disrupt economies 
10 Sutter, Brown and Adamson, Balancing Acts, 12. 
11 Ibid., 4–5. 
 5 
                                                 
worldwide.12 In addition, the geographical area that is encompassed by the rebalance, 
from Japan in the east, to India in the west, is maritime in nature and includes over half of 
mankind. That is reason enough to make the region a focus of US naval strategic interest.  
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The question facing the United States Navy is how the Asia rebalance may shape 
or change the U.S. naval forces role in the region, strategically and diplomatically. Since 
the establishment of the Asian rebalance, the Navy has made little substantive effort to 
establish or publish a new strategy in the Asia-Pacific theater that reflects the new policy. 
The U.S. Navy has developed and issued various force movements to align itself with the 
rebalance, but has not said how these forces will be used. 
This thesis will analyze the development of the Asia rebalance and its possible 
effects on U.S. naval strategy over the next several decades. In order to do so, an 
overview and an in-depth analysis of naval diplomacy must be established to have a 
context for current events. By pulling together U.S. government documents before and 
after the establishment of the rebalance, we will make a comparative approach of the 
Navy toward the Asia-Pacific theater, reflecting several different alternative strategies 
and their impact on the region. Finally, recent analysis and studies by various think tanks 
will be utilized to show possible and recommended reactions by the Navy to the 
rebalance and what the Navy has to do to tailor its strategy respectively to achieve its 
goals in each scenario. 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of naval diplomacy, the current and 
possible responses to the rebalance and its effect on naval policy and strategy then will be 
combined to make observations and recommendations reflecting budgetary and 




                                                 
C. SCOPE, DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The future of the United States Navy in the Asia-Pacific and its essential role in 
stabilizing the region is the foundation of this paper. The specific scope of this thesis is 
not to question the overall policy of the Asia-Pacific rebalance but to explain its goals 
and its effects. It also will present ideas on how the Navy needs to adapt itself to achieve 
an effective end-state. This thesis will focus on United States naval strategy as effected 
by the rebalance and will limit the discussion of potential regional flashpoints. While the 
potential for violent conflict is obviously important in appraising the role of the Navy 
regionally, it is easy for what are, in fact, worst-case scenarios to distort the discussion of 
strategic alternatives, whose starting point should be the most likely range of relevant 
conditions. That is our intention here. 
This thesis does not make use of classified information. Although such material 
might add depth to the analysis of specific issues, its overall impact on the analysis and 
findings of this paper would be minimal. The focus specifically on unclassified policy 
statements and security scholarship has a much broader impact on current and future 
factors that will shape U.S. policy and maritime strategy interests in the region. 
It is important to note several key terms that will be utilized throughout this thesis 
and to define their use and context which will also be expanded upon in the next chapter: 
Naval diplomacy, sea control and sea denial. Naval diplomacy is the use of navies in 
operations short of war in order to achieve a policy objective. Its role in conventional 
deterrence has the dual ability to prevent any possible conflict while also giving the 
United States the ability to continually conduct confidence-building measures in the 
region in order to build defense cooperation and improve military to military regional 
relations. 
Sea control and sea denial are two interrelated terms used exclusively in the 
context of maritime strategy. Sea control is the ability of a nation to utilize a maritime 
region despite the desires of a possible adversary. Directly related, sea denial is the 
perception, the threat or the act of preventing a nation from utilizing the maritime 
domain. Basically, sea control is defensive while sea denial is offensive in nature. In the 
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end, sea control is meant to ensure maritime trade, both your own as well as allies, 
partners and neutrals while the latter is for a set amount of time, to deny others access. 
Both of these are foundations of current and future U.S. maritime strategy.13 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I of this thesis provides the basic framework for further examination of 
issues regarding the development of naval strategy and the Asian rebalance. This section 
focused on background information on the Asian rebalance, sources, methodology, 
organization and definitions of important terms. In the chapters that follow, this thesis 
examines the role of U.S. maritime strategy and in the Asia rebalance. 
In Chapter II, a look at the development of modern naval strategy is provided. 
First, the foundation of modern naval strategy will be looked at defining the importance 
of Mahan and Corbett on current naval strategists. Second, the development of naval 
strategy with a focus on modern naval diplomacy will be analyzed. In addition, two 
capstone naval strategic documents, the 1986 Maritime Strategy and the 2007 A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower will be compared to show the recent 
evolution of U.S. maritime strategy as a point of departure for the Asia-Pacific rebalance 
and its effects. 
Following the turn toward U.S. naval strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, Chapter 
III contains a brief overview of historic U.S. naval involvement throughout the region 
and its past and current basing structure. This is needed form a better understanding of 
the past and current involvement of the United States Navy throughout the Asia-Pacific 
and its continuing importance to the stability and security of the region. 
Chapter IV outlines the strategic rationale for the rebalance, its scope, breadth and 
goals utilizing the idea of U.S. strategic rationale, the security elements that it proposes 
focusing on the regions maritime aspects and finally, how it directly affects the future of 
U.S. basing structure and strategy in the region. 
 13 Till, Seapower, 155–61. 
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Finally, Chapter V provides several different strategic scenarios and strategies 
that could be employed by the U.S. Navy in the future and their possible effects on the 
region. Finally, the Conclusion will compile the findings from Chapters I to V and make 
policy recommendations for future changes not only in strategy but significant 
substantive changes as well which directly reflect U.S. policy goals in the region in 
response to the rebalance. 
  
 9 
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II. MARITIME STRATEGY 
This chapter surveys the development of modern maritime strategy, beginning 
with the seminal works of Mahan and Corbett. Particular emphasis falls on the 
development of American naval strategy leading up to the 2007 A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower, the last U.S. maritime strategic document prior to the 
announcement of the Asian pivot. 
A. FOUNDATION OF NAVAL STRATEGY AND SEA POWER 
1. Mahan 
Maritime strategy is the pursuit of sea power, or the ability to utilize the oceans 
for military or commercial uses and or to prevent an adversary from doing the same. In 
the words of Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The first and most obvious light in which the sea 
presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway.”14 
Mahan wrote at the end of the 19th century, and focused mainly on the use of navies to 
prosecute large scale wars and the tactics necessary to do so. Mahan identified six 
important factors directly contributing to the effectiveness of a nation to attain maritime 
power thus forming the basis of a maritime strategy: geopolitical position, physical 
conformation, including natural production and climate; extent of territory; population; 
culture; and finally the nature of its government and its inherent institutions.15 Mahan’s 
writings cite Great Britain as the supreme practitioner of maritime strategy, and he 
continually emphasized the importance of a powerful navy in world affairs. “Control of 
the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the 
world … and is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity 
of nations.”16  
 14 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1600–1783, (London: Sampson, 
Low, Marston, 1890), 25. 
15 Ibid., 28–29. 
 16 Ibid., 5. 
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Mahan’s notion of sea power, however, is now seen as excessively narrow in its 
application to Great Britain and is difficult to apply toward a general theory or maritime 
strategy. Traditional usage of the term sea power applied to a nation is one in which has a 
maritime focus and strategic outlook and depends primarily upon maritime trade and 
commerce for its economic well-being. He and other contemporaries argued that these 
factors required a maritime strategy to achieve sea control to protect its national security 
and their global interests, especially trade and commerce. His largest achievement for the 
purpose of this thesis is not his emphasis on naval diplomacy, about which he wrote very 
little, but his influence on future naval strategists, specifically, how the navy is an 
additional arm of the government it serves. This is also linked to his British contemporary 
naval historian and strategist Corbett’s analysis of the strength of navies in foreign policy 
in the early 20th century. 
2. Corbett 
Julian Corbett’s Principles on Maritime Strategy emphasized that strategy needs 
to be consciously related to a government’s foreign policy, and that war was a political 
act. In addition, the primary purpose of the navy was to support or obstruct diplomatic 
efforts. Corbett, in contrast to Mahan, placed greater emphasis also focused on limited 
maritime wars, in which the political shaping function of the navy is plain. Unlike 
Mahan, he argued that since maritime warfare is about sea control, an enemy fleet 
blockaded in its own ports is just as effective as one in which a decisive battle is fought 
and it is destroyed. Most importantly, Corbett believed that navies allowed a government 
to weigh the costs and benefits of any operation prior to and during the length of their 
commitment. Maritime operations were more controllable in the sense of being less prone 
to ruinous escalation; they were often particularly cost effective when compared with 
ordinary, messy land operations.17 Corbett argued that naval strategy has to be seen not 
as a separate entity but as a part of the conduct of a greater war.  
Due to the changing global environment since the end of the Cold War, Corbett 
has become much more prevalent in strategic circles. The economic globalization, 
17 Till, Seapower, 47. 
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political uncertainty, and the prevalence of small wars and local conflict between regional 
countries give much more credence to his version of maritime strategy and power than 
the large fleet engagements and competition envisioned by Mahan, which was more 
readily applicable to the large fleets maintained by the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Corbett’s tenets that can be most applied most easily to today are: Use maritime 
forces to increase strategic flexibility; understand the limits of naval diplomacy, 
specifically, complete sea control and the ability to project military power around the 
world is not automatically politically useful; and command of the sea is a means, not an 
end in itself.18 Corbett stated, “Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great 
issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest of cases—
either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life or else 
by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.”19 His arguments 
pressing for a much more global and diplomatic use of the navy can apply directly to 
modern geopolitical situations where the likelihood of even small scale engagement in 
between fleets is highly unlikely due to the importance of globalization and trade to any 
maritime nation. The situation in the Asia-Pacific specifically lends great credence to his 
belief that the role of the navy and its conduct and training must be tempered by the 
political realities and it must be recognized that the navy and its use, whether in large 
scale use or by its very presence, cannot achieve an end state, but must be a part of a 
larger political, economic or military strategy to achieve long term stability and success. 
3. Impact on Modern Strategy 
Mahan and Corbett both shaped maritime strategists over the proceeding 
generations and continue to have immense influence on maritime strategy today. Mahan’s 
lectures and books established sea power and maritime strategy as fundamental 
instruments of national power, and continue to influence current thought both for the U.S. 
and for other navies around the world, particularly China. Corbett’s relevance today can 
 18 Geoffrey Till, “Sir Julian Corbett: Ten Maritime Commandments,” in The Changing Face of 
Maritime Power,” eds., Andrew Dorman, Mike Lawrence Smith and Mathew R. H. Uttley (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1999). 
19 J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, vol.1, (London: Longmans Green, 1907), 67. 
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clearly be seen through his emphasis on naval diplomacy and the role that navies have in 
grander political and strategic endgames. He recognized that the role that the Navy has as 
an element of a political arm, while mirroring ideas put forth by the 19th century military 
strategist Clausewitz on land warfare, were revolutionary to maritime strategy at the time. 
These two strategists were the primary shapers of global maritime strategy over the next 
50 years through the end of World War II. This can be seen through the massive naval 
deployments and the importance of naval engagements in both World Wars, exemplified 
in the Pacific theater during World War II where massive fleets engaged each other to 
achieve sea control and eventual global dominance. It isn’t until the development of 
modern maritime strategy during the Cold War that their ideas were continually refined 
and expanded upon to reflect modern geopolitical realities such as globalization and the 
use of naval diplomacy short of war. 
B. MODERN NAVAL STRATEGISTS 
The end of World War II signaled an abrupt end to large-scale maritime warfare 
as envisioned by Mahan. Maritime strategists of this time period thus had to dramatically 
shape and change their perception of navies and their use in naval diplomatic efforts 
around the periphery due to their sudden importance during the Cold War. Since the end 
of the Cold War as well, these peripheral operations in global maritime strategy continue 
to adjust themselves to modern geopolitical realities and the decreased emphasis on direct 
large-scale maritime conflict. The naval strategists of this time period that were the most 
prolific and important were Stansfield Turner, Edward Luttwak, Ken Booth, James Cable 
and Geoffrey Till. This section will discuss their contribution to maritime strategy and 
diplomacy since the end of World War II. 
The rapid growth and rise of the Soviet Navy and its resulting capability to 
challenge the United States Navy during the Cold War caused a strategic dilemma for the 
United States. Admiral Stansfield Turner voiced a much needed strategic shift, and 
through his direct efforts, successfully incorporated it into U.S. naval doctrine. His efforts 
in implementing the idea of the naval presence mission as the embodiment of gunboat 
diplomacy has had a lasting impact, and it continues to be a central mission for the U.S. 
 14 
Navy. Specifically, he believed that the naval presence mission is the use of naval forces 
short of war to achieve political objectives through its ability to deter actions or to 
encourage actions that are against or for the interests of the United States. He continually 
cites the Soviet Union as the main focus of naval presence missions and how through its 
efforts, the Navy is able to manage the Soviet Union’s actions globally. Although his 
focus is purely on the operations of the United States Navy, his forceful statement of the 
ability of the Navy to achieve political aims is central to current naval strategy.20 
Additional contributors to naval strategy are Luttwak’s The Political Uses of Sea 
Power, published in 1974, and Ken Booth’s Navies and Foreign Policy, published in 
1979. Luttwak discusses several different roles of naval strategy focusing on the use of 
deployments in naval diplomacy. They are naval suasion through latent, routine 
undirected deployments and active deployments by conscious design in order to shape the 
actions of regional actors. These actions are designed to promote allies, deter opponents 
or to compel them to modify their policy to suit the needs of their government. However, 
he does not cite specific examples of these deployments or what these forces should 
contain in order to successfully shape diplomacy.21 Booth does cite that the composition, 
locality, readiness and activity of deployed naval forces, naval aid (help in training and 
arms supply), operational calls and specific goodwill visits as the tools of naval 
diplomacy but it was his belief that only strong navies have the ability to influence 
foreign policy. 22 
James Cable’s contribution to naval strategy is his focus on the act of utilizing 
naval force in history. His analysis is historically based, and he utilized examples from 
Greek times through the Cold War to illustrate its usefulness in achieving political ends. 
His main arguments focus on the use of limited force for purposes short of war. He 
distinguishes between four  forms by which such force can be used: definitive force, used 
 20 Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 26, no. 5 (March–April 
1974), 2–17.  
 21 Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974). 
22 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979). 
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to produce an exact goal; purposeful force, to persuade other nations to change their 
policy; catalytic force, intended to influence events in some unspecified but 
presumptively beneficial manner; and expressive force, when navies are utilized to 
emphasize political will or support general diplomatic initiatives. Unfortunately, he is 
missing any actual applicable guidance on naval strategy and how it should be adapted to 
multilateral situations. His analysis focused mainly on bilateral relationships while his 
strengths are the importance of navies in the future, the impact of technology and their 
supreme adaptability.23 
As the most recent published on naval strategy, Geoffrey Till’s Seapower: A 
Guide for the Twenty-First Century, attempts to summarize, briefly, what the others 
discussed. In addition he attempts to address recent phenomena such as the importance of 
maritime resources, trade and globalization. In addition, he also emphasizes in his 
writings that all navies have the ability to impact foreign policy, despite their size, even 
so far as to state that navies can make said policy instead of actually serving it if its use 
results in things exceed its original mandate (i.e., the German U-Boat campaign or the 
USS VINCENNES). He expands the definition of what encompasses naval diplomacy 
into areas not specifically mentioned before into areas such as expeditionary operations, 
humanitarian operations, picture building and coalition building.24 
C. GLOBALIZATION AND MODERN MARITIME STRATEGY 
The end of the Cold War signaled the elimination of a clear threat to the United 
States. In fact, in distinct contrast to the Soviet Union, crises, either humanitarian disaster 
response or small conflicts can happen around the globe simultaneously. The United 
States now needed the flexibility and versatility to deter war if possible while projecting 
U.S. influence abroad sustainably. Deterrence specifically requires constant U.S. forces 
that can loiter in a possible crisis zone indefinitely yet withdraw with little loss of 
influence in the area. All of these reasons have contributed to the growth in importance of 
the United States naval diplomacy and its associated maritime strategy.  
 23 James Cable, Political Influence of Naval Force in History, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998). 
24 Till, Seapower, 34. 
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This section will explore the overall changes to maritime strategy since the end of 
the Cold War by discussing globalization and its implications. In addition, it will contrast 
the Cold War mentality represented by the 1986 Maritime Strategy discussed in the last 
section with the A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which represents the 
United States post-Cold War maritime strategy which has continued to be emphasized in 
more recent United States policy documents and actions. This will show the changing 
attitudes of maritime strategists and their recognition that they now must incorporate 
many new factors outside of fleet on fleet engagement of sea control to ensure modern 
relevance reflecting new political realities. 
1. Globalization 
Globalization is one of the most important factors of the 21st century strategic 
environment. The importance of global trading networks to economic prosperity is a 
prime determinant for a country’s security policy. The resulting importance of maritime 
trade also continues to cause an expansion of sea power to protect a country’s overseas 
interests. This can be seen recently in the expansion of maritime operating areas for 
navies of industrialized countries such as China, Japan and Western Europe. This is all 
due to the inherent need of globalization to depend on maritime trade and system 
integration for success.25 
The integration of the global economic system, however, has distinct 
disadvantages as far as security concerns are associated. Due to the emergence of an 
extremely efficient global supply and demand system, it is increasingly vulnerable to 
disruption which can have global consequences. Finally, new transnational threats such 
as terrorism, human and drug trafficking and other forms of maritime crime all point the 
central role that maritime strategy and sea power have in the protection of the system. 26 
The defense of the system requires a maritime strategy and capability which 
encompasses the entire range of military operations from presence and security 
 25  Geoffrey Till, Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern/Post-modern Navies of the Asia-
Pacific (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007), 2–5. 
26 Ibid., 6. 
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cooperation or training all the way to large scale conflict. To conduct operations in this 
integrated environment navies have been forced to incorporate the traditional missions of 
Cold War of sea control and expeditionary operations with the more recent inclusion of 
good order at sea and the insurance of stability in the maritime status quo.27 
The mission of sea control has changed since its original foundation with the 
increased importance of the littoral regions and the advent of expanding threats from new 
technology such as missiles or swarming attacks from fast attack craft. In addition, it is 
less important to secure the great commons for a country’s own use and more so to 
ensure its access for everyone but the immediate entities of the system. In other words, 
freedom of navigation is now a central tenement of maintaining the system along with 
expeditionary operations. 28 
Expeditionary operations have also taken on a much more systemic role in the 
maintenance and insurance of stability across the globe. This is similar to the Corbett 
emphasis on the effects of the navy ashore, but even more specific in their scope, aim and 
duration in order to accomplish limited political goals. Basically, it is the belief that if a 
crisis is not curtailed or combatted somehow it can have global consequences thus 
impacting the entire globalized system. These threats can be rogue or failed states, 
humanitarian disasters, inter or intra-state conflict or the threat of non-state actors. In 
other words, most of the threats to the system now come from land based occurrences 
vice sea borne ones as espoused by Mahan.29 
Good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus are the two 
missions that have grown dramatically in importance since the advent of intense 
integration and globalization since the end of the Cold War. Good order at sea centers on 
maritime domain awareness and basic legal actions in accordance with international law 
to ensure the legal use of the oceans by all parties and to prevent their use by illegal non-
state actors or criminal organizations. Maintaining the maritime status quo is not a new 
27 Till, Globalization: Implications, 7.  
28 Ibid., 8. 
29 Ibid., 9–11. 
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mission for the United States Navy because the Cold War forced the U.S. to assume 
stewardship of the entire western economic system which included ensuring the 
protection of the maritime commons. In fact, several studies have shown that the United 
States Navy’s forward presence produces increased economic benefit not only to the 
United States but other industrialized countries around Further increasing globalization 
and market integration will only increase this positive effect.30 Recently however, the 
new model now encompasses all maritime nations able to contribute to the security of the 
system, not just the United States and its primary allies. This also encompasses naval 
diplomacy operations as well as global security cooperation which are essential to 
maintaining and growing the system with new and effective members.  
These new efforts now being widely recognized as a cornerstone of future United 
States maritime strategy were originally encompassed by such ideas of the “1000 ship 
Navy” and the “global maritime partnership” pushed for by the United States in 2006 and 
2007, respectively, and it was included in the A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower. They can also be seen in more recent policy documents such as the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2012 National Security Strategy which was one of 
the initial cornerstones of the Asia-Pacific pivot. The following section discusses the 
Cooperative Strategy and its recent espousal of modern maritime strategy and diplomacy 
as compared to the earlier 1986 Maritime Strategy at the height of the Cold War. 
2. Cooperative Strategy 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is a clear representation of the 
changing role that the Navy has taken on since the end of the Cold War. The 1986 
Maritime Strategy had a clear goal in mind of deterring or defeating Soviet aggression 
and the document focused on traditional Mahanian sea control and power projection 
missions to engage in a multi-theater war. The lack of a rival global maritime power in 
the near future on the level of the Soviet Union represented by its global 1975 OKEAN 
exercises is an isolated possibility. This idea, included with the prevalence and the 
 30 Robert E. Looney, “Market Effects of Naval Presence in a Globalized World: A Research 
Summary,” Globalization and Maritime Power, ed., Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 2002) 103–130. 
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importance of globalization to the global political, economic and security environment 
has forced the Navy to adjust its former wartime priorities. 
The small possibility of large scale naval strife and the importance of the global 
commons to the linked national interests of all modernizing nations give credence to 
Julian Corbett’s argument that an uncontrolled sea is the normal state of affairs and the 
possibility of overwhelming long term control of the oceans as Mahan envisioned in 
today’s geopolitical and fiscal environment is impossible. Corbett stated that the key to 
protecting world-wide shipping is to concentrate your forces for sea control at vital points 
around the globe.31 Admiral Mike Mullen’s 2006 “Global Maritime Partnership” and the 
subsequent maritime strategy was an attempt to recognize this fact and was the only way 
strategically possible to apply sufficient resources to cover vital global waters.32 The 
strategy was a departure from former documents in other ways as well, such as its open 
development within easy access of publicity while even including inputs from various 
public forums called, “Conversations with the Country.” 
One of the most contrasting elements with the 1986 strategy is the lack of distinct 
security threat outlined in the 2007 document. While in development the strategy’s 
writers distinctly chose to avoid any direct mention of China or any other nation-state 
level threat. This has a dual purpose of opening the possibility of future courtship of 
bilateral and multi-lateral agreements with more aggressive regional powers with the 
hope of incorporating them into a security cooperation framework. Throughout the 
document the interconnecting nature of globalization is specifically mentioned and the 
importance of continued global stability and growth which contrasts with the western 
focus of the 1986 strategy. 
The authors’ emphasis on the defense of the global wide system is a clear 
indication of the incorporation of more global centric and cooperative strategies than 
 31 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 1911; ed. Eric J. Grove (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1988), 91–94.  
 32 Geoff Fine, “Global Maritime Partnership; Gaining Steam at Home and with International Navies,” 




                                                 
those espoused during the Cold War. The role of providing maritime security is one that 
has fallen to the United States since the end of World War II thus legitimizing its 
maritime hegemony. While channeling Mahan and the importance of commerce to the 
United States its incorporation of the system at large is a drastic departure, “The Security, 
prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of 
other nations…and are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of 
interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.”33 
The lack of emphasis on wars or conflicts is also a direct departure from former 
strategies. Although mentioned in the document, they are portrayed as a disruption of the 
all-important system, not as a direct national security threat to the United States. In fact, 
war in general is only included in a short list of other threats which also encompasses 
natural disasters and inequality driven by economic liberalization among other 
occurrences that are not necessarily triggered through the actions of another state. The 
strategy also discussed global efforts to combat the second or third tier effects of these 
contingencies which emphasize the variety of roles that the United States might play. 
The final portion of the strategy outlines the maritime services six strategic 
capabilities consisting of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection 
ashore, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. To achieve 
these ends the document states that the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard must all 
improve interoperability with foreign nations, bolster maritime domain awareness, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity while training their service members to be 
capable of operating in these multilateral security environments. 
A major critique, ironically, of the 2007 maritime strategy is that it is so unlike 
the 1984 version and that it is not inherently a strategy and more of a strategic concept. 
The argument is that a strategy while consisting of goals and core capabilities must also 
outline a path for how these goals might be achieved. The defeat of the Soviet Union in 
the 1984 document is clearly outlined with the specific force structure needed as well as 
 33 United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard, A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), accessed August 28, 
2013. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf. 
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general guidance for allocated resources and missions to achieve the strategic end-state. 
This is something that the 2007 strategy is completely missing.34 However, considering 
the global audience intended for this audience in order to convince other nations to sign 
up for other multi-lateral security initiatives the lack of these specifics is purposeful. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed the development of the current maritime strategy of the 
United States. Mahan and Corbett and their effect on more recent naval strategists and 
their continued relevance were discussed. Secondly, we outlined the development of U.S. 
maritime strategy ending with the most recent maritime strategy espoused by the United 
States prior to the Asian rebalance, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
was analyzed in order to set up the effects of the new U.S. policy. 
In order to successfully address the modern use of the U.S. Navy and the effect of 
the rebalance, an overview of historic and current U.S. naval involvement in the region is 
necessary in order to emphasize any modification due to the new policy. Chapter III 
contains a brief overview of historic U.S. naval involvement throughout the Asia-Pacific 
and its past and current basing structure in the region. This is needed to lay the 
foundation for and as a point of departure for the Asian rebalance in Chapter IV.  
  
 34 Robert O. Work and Jan van Tol, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: An 
Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 1–4.  
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III. THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
This chapter contains a brief overview of historic U.S. naval involvement 
throughout the region and its past and current basing structure. This is needed form a 
better understanding of the past and current involvement of the United States Navy 
throughout the Asia-Pacific and its past and current importance to the stability and 
security of the region. 
A. HISTORIC U.S. NAVAL INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA 
An analysis of new strategic trends cannot be undertaken without understanding 
the past involvement and impact of the U.S. Navy on Asia. As a maritime nation relying 
on trade since its founding, the United States Navy has only been focused on Asia since 
the 1850s with its desire to protect its commercial interests in the area. Over the course of 
the next 150 years, its involvement deepened to become the main security provider in the 
region. 
The establishment of the United States and its growth as a maritime trading nation 
existed since its founding. Its Navy’s interest in the Pacific initially revolved around the 
protection of its whaling, fishing and merchant fleets which were then opening new 
markets in Japan and China.35 The first use of American Gunboat Diplomacy in the 
Pacific was by Commodore Matthew Perry with the opening of isolationist Japan then 
ruled by the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1854 and continued with the Boxer Rebellion in 
1890 when U.S. Navy gunboats and marines joined an international force to rescue 
diplomats besieged in their legations in Beijing.36 This gunboat diplomacy directly tied to 
commercial interests which expanded to imperialistic and expansionist ambitions near the 
turn of the 19th century with the creation of various U.S. sovereign interests in the Pacific 
to assist the United States Navy in projecting its power into Asia to match its peers in 
Europe. This was also driven in part by the teaching of Alfred Thayer Mahan whose 
 35Arthur P. Dudden, “The American Pacific: Where the West Was Also Won,” Studies in the 
Economic History of the Pacific Rim, eds., Sally M. Miller, A.J.H. Latham and Dennis O. Flynn, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 94–103.  
36 Ibid., 98. 
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offensive battle-fleet and sea control concepts became a cornerstone of American foreign 
policy for the next 50 years.37 
The teachings of Mahan were directly linked to the push by the Navy and the 
United States government in making Hawaii a principal American naval base and coaling 
station in 1887 followed by its annexation in 1898.  At the turn of the 20th century 
desires for overseas markets and to increase its standing among peer countries in Europe 
the U.S. expanded its influence in Asia through war with Spain in 1898.38 
The U.S. Navy’s Asiatic squadron, under Commodore George Dewey, was the 
primary instrument in the defeat of the Spanish and its fleet in the Philippines. The 
succession of the Philippines to the United States in 1899 was quickly followed that same 
year by a treaty negotiated with Great Britain and Germany to obtain sovereignty over the 
six eastern Samoan Islands. These islands and their associated access to commercial 
interests in the rest of Asia then began to clash with Japan, the rising regional power. The 
United States began to view Japan as a peer competitor not only economically but 
militarily with their defeat of the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the 
Russians in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 with decisive naval victories resulting in 
their rise to regional hegemon in direct competition with Western Powers in the Pacific.39 
Competition with Japan in the Pacific defined the strategy of the United States 
government and its Navy from 1905 through World War II.40 As the most probable foe, 
the Navy spent the next 35 years attempting to develop and implement a strategy called 
War Plan Orange that would temper Japanese aggression while providing a way for a 
decisive defeat in an event of war. The Washington Naval Treaty was an effort to assuage 
both U.S. and Japanese fears and the 5:5:3 tonnage ratio and lack of American 
fortification of its Pacific holdings established by the agreement allowed for a stable 
situation. If the U.S. did not build up to its treaty limits and Japan did, as happened at the 
 37George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993) 2.  
38 Ibid., 3.  
39 Ibid., 3. 
40 Ibid., 90. 
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beginning of WWII, they would face an extreme force disadvantage in the Western 
Pacific until new construction could offset the discrepancy.41 The end of WWII and the 
imposition of American authority and dominance over the world’s oceans proceeded to 
cause a strategic dilemma for U.S. naval strategy in Asia due to a lack of a plausible 
foe.42 This changed with the beginning of the Cold War. 
The end of World War II and the immediate post-war years saw not only massive 
demobilization, but a huge public affairs push by both the air force and the army to 
absorb naval aviation and the marines into their fold in order to unify command authority. 
Navy manning dropped from more than 3,000,000 in 1945 to 390,000, and decreased 
from a high of more than 6,700 ships to 634 by the start of the Korean War in 1950.43 
The threat of the Soviet Union resulting in the strategic imperative of containment and an 
aversion to full scale war which could result in mutually assured destruction led to the 
strategic niche that the Navy searched for to justify its importance in national strategy. 
Wherever the United States lacked bases, the Navy could operate, and its advantages of 
mobility, readiness, versatility and a seaborne force with land-projection capabilities that 
was supremely flexible in its use gave policymakers an ability to respond that is more 
variable and less provocative than the air force and army. 44  
The United States Navy’s missions during the Cold War remained entrenched in 
the global strategy of Containment. Through Sea Control, support would be given to our 
allies and to our forces overseas in order to hold the line against Communism. In 
addition, the Navy and Marine Corps team would utilize its amphibious operations and its 
carrier strike capabilities to assist in both the Korean and Vietnam wars. In total, over 
95% of the supplies in both Korea and Vietnam were transported by sea and the supply 
lines had to be maintained through a 7,000 mile long logistic chain through the Pacific 
back to the United States. The Seventh Fleet based out of Japan was essential for all of 
these missions, and their Asia-Pacific wide reach was critical for supporting the 
41 Baer, One Hundred Years, 100–101.  
42 Ibid., 3–4. 
43 Ibid., 278. 
44 Ibid., 282.  
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American regional allies of Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, 
Taiwan and Pakistan as well as the assurance of sea control against the threat of Soviet 
strategic submarines from the Korean War all the way through the Vietnam War.45 
However, the massive Soviet maritime rearmament program in the 1960s and 1970s 
resulted in a reassessment of the U.S. Navy’s strategy in the Pacific. 
The Cuban Missile crises in 1962 showed the Soviet Union that it needed a naval 
force capable to project limited sea control against the U.S. Navy and to support their 
interventionist policies around the world. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Chief of the 
Soviet Navy throughout this period, desired the additional flexibility in policy acquired 
by maintaining a global maritime force instead of their blind reliance on strategic nuclear 
parity with the west. By 1971 the Soviet Navy had more nuclear submarines in service 
and under construction than the U.S. and in addition began to utilize their significant 
maritime force in overseas missions thus presenting the U.S. Navy with its first Sea 
Control dilemma since World War II.46 
In combination with the post-Vietnam War naval draw down bringing U.S. ship 
numbers to their lowest since before World War II, the Soviets in the 1970s also built up 
their Pacific Fleet to an unprecedented level. By the 1980s, over 30 percent of their total 
forces were on the Pacific Coast to include 23 SSBN’s and 125 attack submarines as well 
as 90 major surface combatants, a force totaling more than the Soviet Northern Fleet. In 
addition, they also expanded their support bases around Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk and 
Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam for patrol in the South China Sea, Southern Pacific and the 
Indian Ocean region. All evidence led to the idea that the soviets were preparing for 
significant action in the Pacific.47 
The 1980s saw a large increase in expenditures for the United States Navy and a 
new strategy in the Asia-Pacific. From the naval diplomacy and Third World 
interventionist ideas of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt based around a defensive-oriented Navy 
45 Baer, One Hundred Years, 392.  
46 Ibid., 398. 
47 Ibid., 424. 
 26 
                                                 
came Admiral Thomas Hayward’s vision of an offensive action based around the pre-
existing fleet assets to include newly re-commissioned battleships, large attack carriers, 
attack submarines and amphibious forces all based out of fleet concentration areas to 
include the 7th Fleet in the Pacific. By the end of the 1980s this strategy remained a 
purely naval oriented strategy with little to no tie in with a national strategy or policy 
despite the large expenditures to make it possible. This investment and focus on offensive 
warfare operations ended with the Cold War. The collapse of the U.S. Navy’s only 
competitor saw a return to the strategic dilemma maintaining an expansive and powerful 
Navy capable of global maritime dominance.48 
Post-Cold War the Navy in the Pacific continues to have difficulty defining its 
role. Since the 1980s the focus of U.S. foreign policy remained on the Middle East 
beginning with the collapse of Iran and continuing with the Iran Hostage Crises, the Iran-
Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This section’s brief overview of the United States Navy’s 
involvement in the Asia-Pacific shows the traditional emphasis and importance that the 
Navy has placed on its role in the region. 
B. U.S. NAVAL BASING IN ASIA 
Maritime basing throughout the Asia-Pacific is an important aspect of U.S. 
maritime strategy that needs to be discussed in order to understand any long term effects 
of the rebalance. This section will outline the history of U.S. naval basing and its current 
structure as a foundation for any changes the Asian rebalance will have on the U.S. 
maritime strategy. 
1. HISTORY OF U.S. NAVAL BASES 
Current global basing structures can be traced back to Great Britain, which 
maintained the first truly global military basing network in order to support its empire. In 
order to maintain its trading dominance and protect its commerce it had to maintain 
forward garrisons around the world. In order to achieve this they built a network of bases 
48 Baer, One Hundred Years, 419–22, 443–444.  
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that commanded most of the strategic waterways important to their commerce. The 
United States naval basing network can now be seen as an outgrowth and a continuation 
of British global dominance.49 However, unlike Britain who had built their basing 
network beginning in the 18th century, the United States did not begin to expand outside 
of the continental United States until the turn on the 20th century. 
The first overseas bases were established as coaling stations in the Pacific 
beginning in 1857 with the acquisition of Jarvis, Baker, and Howland Islands followed by 
Midway in 1867. Shortly thereafter, the Navy and the United States government pressed 
in making Hawaii a principal American naval base and coaling station in 1887 followed 
by its annexation in 1898 after the Spanish American War.50 The succession of the 
Philippines to the United States in 1899 was quickly followed that same year by a treaty 
negotiated with Great Britain and Germany to obtain sovereignty over the six eastern 
Samoan Islands as well as Wake Island.51 
In between World War I and World War II there was little to no expansion of the 
United States basing presence throughout Asia. The onset of World War II changed this 
dramatically. In 1942, only a year after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and the war 
department created proposals for a global network of bases that would be established 
once the war was over. It was Roosevelt’s belief that these bases could have a stabilizing 
effect on global politics and economic growth as well as becoming beneficial for 
American interests.52 The war also assisted the U.S. in the creation of these bases, as 
could be seen in the island hopping campaign in the Pacific which necessitated their 
creation for logistical support for the thousands of ships and aircraft and the millions of 
U.S. personnel in theater. These bases were particularly expanded and strengthened in the 
Pacific on islands such as Guam, Okinawa and Hawaii. At wars end, more than 44 
percent of all U.S. overseas facilities were in Asia. This network only increased with the 
49 Baer, One Hundred Years, 9–13. 
50 Ibid., 3.  
51 Ibid., 3. 
 52 Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism, 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2007), 13. 
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acquisition and creation of bases in Korea and Japan as well as all overseas Japanese 
holdings.53 The United States basing structure in Asia and the American role in the 
security, economic and political environment throughout the region continued to be 
expanded during the Cold War. 
The Cold War and the primacy of the United States in international institutions 
that supported the West economically, politically and militarily continued to give 
credence to the basing network in Asia. The weakness of Great Britain, the former global 
hegemon, and the reversal of Chinese government to Communism also contributed 
greatly to increased U.S. presence regionally. The U.S. became the guarantor of security 
and stability around the globe to include Asia, and it realized that it needed widespread 
bases to not only defend critical strategic points, but also to support any potential 
logistical needs of itself or its allies and partners.54  
Permanent American preeminence was justified in Asia with the outbreak of the 
Korean War, creating the impetus for the signing of NSC-68, a massive expansion of 
U.S. Defense expenditure and global presence, as well as the completion of the San 
Francisco Treaty with Japan ensuring large scale and indefinite access to numerous U.S. 
Bases in Japan and Okinawa. This treaty was later used as a framework for defense 
treaties with South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand which 
also expanded U.S. basing and access in those countries as well. These agreements 
created the initial framework for U.S. Cold War presence in Asia, parts of which remain 
until today.55 
It is important to note that outside of the permanent U.S. naval bases established 
throughout Asia with the completion of various bi-lateral defense treaties, the most 
important being the naval bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan, as well as Subic Bay, 
Philippines, there were also additional logistic and support bases established to support 
both the Korean War and the Vietnam War which were later abandoned or given to host 
53 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 14. 
54 Ibid., 15.  
55 Ibid., 21–32. 
 29 
                                                 
nations upon the completion of hostilities. A prime example of this in Cam Ranh Bay 
Naval Base in Vietnam, as well as numerous air fields established in Thailand during the 
Vietnam conflict.56 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to ever-increasing pressure for the 
downsizing of the Cold War era overseas basing structure. The most important example 
of this is the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines in 1992 due to 
political pressure both from the Philippine government as well as domestically in 
conjunction with the destruction caused from the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. The United 
States also saw continued forward presence as indispensable for continued regional 
economic and political stability so many primary U.S. security hubs remained. The U.S. 
naval bases in Hawaii, Guam, and Japan hosted new capabilities and missions, in part to 
replicate the reduced forward presence caused by the withdrawal from the Philippines. 
These bases continue to act as facilities for the support of global logistics, transportation, 
communications, strategic deterrence, and for the support of resource security.57. In 
addition, conflicts such as the two wars in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, or new 
security threats such as China, North Korea and especially with the advent of 9-11, Anti-
Terrorism has also become a justification for expanding or strengthening additional naval 
access around Asia.58 
2. CURRENT NAVAL BASING STRUCTURE IN ASIA 
This section describes and analyzes the current naval basing strategies in the Asia-
Pacific region. In addition, it will describe the current agreements that the U.S. has with 
various countries around Asia in order to establish the layout of United States Naval 
basing strategy in the region as a point of future departure. 
The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ever changing and shifting 
international system have highlighted the complexities and the uncertainties of basing 
 56 Carnes Lord, ed., Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-First Century, 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), accessed November 12, 2013, 17. 
http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx. 
57 Ibid., 38–39.  
58 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 39–41.  
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access around the world. Throughout the last 12 years, questions of access to include 
overhead transit rights for various nations have caused numerous issues in supporting 
various operations around the globe. The crucial importance now and in the future of 
American basing access at a time of changing alliances and possible threats as well as the 
current issues of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and piracy all contribute to the 
need for assured access. The current security environment in Asia continues to be 
ambiguous. In place of the threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, there is now a 
multifaceted and fluid threat environment. The primary stabilizing force remains the 
United States Navy and essential to this presence are its overseas bases. 
The United States has been changing its Asian presence to combat new threats 
emanating from new sources regionally. Its current basing structure in Asia can be 
categorized into several distinct types of facilities, main-operating bases, forward 
operating sites and cooperative security locations. Main operating bases involve 
significant infrastructure, personnel, and support presence to include command and 
control structures and family support facilities.59 The naval facilities in the Asia-Pacific 
that meet this requirement are the various air and naval bases on Guam and Hawaii, 
Yokosuka and Sasebo naval bases as well as Misawa naval air station in Japan and the 
naval and air bases on Diego Garcia. It is important to note that Guam, Diego Garcia and 
Hawaii are all immune to internal political pressure for the removal of U.S. forces due to 
their unique political aspects. Guam, as a U.S. Territory, and Hawaii, as part of the 
United States are immune to foreign basing issues and Diego Garcia, as a small British 
Territory with no native populace and a joint operating agreement also is quite immune to 
political dissent. 
The second type of base that is typical in the Asia-Pacific theater is a forward 
operating site. This is a facility that is kept in readiness condition with few personnel and 
could also contain prepositioned equipment. In addition, these sites can also play host to 
rotational forces which can be used for multi-lateral training opportunities.60 Examples 
59 Lord, Reposturing the Force, 16. 
60 Ibid., 20. 
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around the Asia-Pacific include the Sembawang port facility in Singapore, Utapao in 
Thailand, and Naval Air Station Atsugi in Japan. 
The final type of United States base that is located in the Asia-Pacific is known as 
a Cooperative Security Location. These have almost no American presence during 
normal operation and are maintained using host country or contracting support and 
remain in a host country’s possession and control. These provide distinct contingency 
access and serve as gathering and forward logistical supply points for regional security 
cooperation activities.61 These bases, with minimal U.S. presence can provide forward 
operating locations and can act as deterrence to regional conflict because they are also 
reinforced by significant political and security agreements. Some examples in the Asia-
Pacific are the new rotational marine forces to be located in Darwin Australia, and the 
security agreements with the Philippines to utilize Subic Bay Naval Base. 
C. SUMMARY 
This sectioned outlined the past involvement of the United States Navy in the 
Asia-Pacific. In addition, it discussed the past and current basing structure of the United 
States Navy in the Asia-Pacific as a point of departure for the Asian rebalance. This was 
important to truly understand the depth and breadth of U.S. involvement in the region and 
its importance to the security and stability of countries around the region. 
Chapter IV begins the discussion of the Asian rebalance and outlines its rationale, 
its goals, and the security elements that it entails which will impact the Navy into the 
future. 
61 Ibid., 20. 
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IV. THE ASIAN REBALANCE 
In 2011 and early 2012 the Obama administration put forth an important change 
to United States foreign policy: The rebalancing of its political, economic and security 
interests toward Asia. The administration took the stance that the United States had 
become embroiled in the Middle East and had moved itself away from its true strategic 
interests in Asia and was in need of a recalibration back toward a traditional emphasis on 
the Asia-Pacific. However, what the rebalance is actually shifting back toward, and what 
it entails, continues to be the subject of continuous debate despite over two years passing 
since its implementation. This is especially important considering the maritime 
dimension of the theater and the significant political and security challenges faced within 
the region. 
This chapter will outline the strategic rationale for the rebalance, its scope, 
breadth and goals utilizing the idea of U.S. strategic rationale, the security elements that 
it proposes focusing on the regions maritime aspects and finally, how it directly affects 
the future of U.S. basing structure and strategy in the region. 
A. THE ASIAN REBALANCE 
1. Strategic Rationale 
The Asian Rebalance began in the fall of 2011 when the Obama administration 
announced an expansion and intensification of its role in the Asia-Pacific Region. Along 
with several other steps, the administration signaled that it was placing a higher level of 
priority to the region shifting U.S. foreign policy away from its focus on the Middle East. 
Despite a strong perception among regional observers in China that the rebalance is 
aligned to contain China this is only a small portion of the overall strategic rationale 
involved in making this policy change.62 
 62 Joseph Nye, “Our Pacific Predicament,” The American Interest Online, (February 12, 2013), 
accessed December 12, 2013. http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/02/12/our-pacific-
predicament/.  
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While the United States government and policy advisors are keenly aware of the 
military, economic and political rise of China, the rebalance has in fact been driven by 
many broader considerations as well. Following over a decade of war and crises in the 
Middle East the administration made the strategic decision to place more emphasis on the 
area of the world that will be of continuing economic and strategic importance over the 
next several decades. The policy is based on the perceived desire by many Asia-Pacific 
countries for continued strategic reassurance in the face of a rising and increasingly 
assertive and aggressive China. 63 The rebalance has a goal of not only reassuring U.S. 
allies and partners regionally but other regional countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam 
and regional powers such as India that the United States has not become withdrawn or 
strategically exhausted after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and provide support to 
develop multilateral regional norms that continue to create a stable environment. 
The stable economic, political and security environment continues to be essential 
to United States interests and will continue to be defined by future events throughout 
Asia. The region is already the primary destination for exports from the United States and 
the growing Asian economies continue to be some of the most important markets for 
United States exports and investment.64 In addition, over a million jobs in the United 
States are linked to the Asian portion of the exporting sector in the U.S. economy with 39 
U.S. states sending at least a quarter of their exports to Asia.65 In addition, Asian 
investment into the United States and U.S. investment regionally have doubled over the 
last decade.66 Maintaining these economic links and regional stability has been driven by 
the leadership of the United States with the support of regional allies and partners. These 
economic imperatives are also linked to the threat from various regional flashpoints 
which could threaten regional and thus U.S. prosperity. 
63 Tomas Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive 
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2, (March/April 2011), 54–7. 





                                                 
The largest strategic threats to continued regional stability are an increasingly 
aggressive China, the continued instability and aggressive nature of North Korea and 
other nontraditional security threats such as natural disasters, piracy, human and drug 
trafficking, and terrorism.67 The administration found it necessary to thus mitigate the 
likelihood and effect of these various threats and continue to promote regional growth 
and prosperity by shifting the focus of its foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific. 
2. Strategic Geography 
The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific continues to be a confusing endeavor in part due 
to the vague and unclear language used to define the administrations perception of 
America’s strategic geography. The questions that this section answers are why strategic 
geography is important and how does it apply to Asia-Pacific? 
Strategic geographies are important in defining the linkages between a country’s 
interests, requirements, vulnerabilities and its capabilities in relation to the physical 
environment. When developed, a correct strategic geography would help policy makers 
clarify the scope of their interests and their implications. In addition, the defined 
geography also can help to coordinate their interests both internally and externally among 
allies and partners as well as to communicate these commitments to potential adversaries. 
However, when defined incorrectly, they can lead to gross over or under extension. This 
can be seen during the interwar years in between World War I and World War II when 
the U.S. became isolationist by defining its strategic geography as the Western 
Hemisphere when in fact due to the economic, political, security and cultural linkages 
established throughout the twentieth century made these assumptions completely 
shortsighted and left the U.S. unprepared. In addition, an example of overextension can 
be seen through the widely used “War on Terror” which directly contributed to U.S. 
involvement in a decade of war and conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East at 
large. Thus defining the strategic geography of the new rebalance policy is important in 
67 Jonathan W. Greenert, “Sailing into the 21st Century: Operating Forward, Strengthening 
Partnerships,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 65, (Second Quarter, 2012), 68–74. 
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order to properly focus and align U.S. efforts in an era of a growing importance 
throughout Asia.68 
In 2011 as one of the first elaborations of the policy, then Secretary of State 
Clinton in an essay in Foreign Policy remarked that the policy would focus on the Asia-
Pacific, but that India and South Asia were perceived to be part of the region.69 This was 
further emphasized when in June 2012 in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, then-
Secretary of Defense Panetta also defined the Asia-Pacific as including India.70 The 
reasoning behind including India and all of South Asia in the Asia-Pacific is multifaceted. 
First, China and India’s economic growth and resultant political and military strength 
have turned them into regional powers and competitors which is major shift in regional 
security dynamics. Secondly, India’s ‘Look East Policy’ and its strong economic, security 
and political ties to its neighbors in Southeast Asia since economic liberalization in the 
early 1990’s have made it a primary stakeholder in regional forums such as the East 
Asian Summit, ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum as well as various bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral free trade and security agreements.71 Finally, the rising economic 
expansion of both East and Southeast Asia depend upon a continual flow of resources 
from the Middle East, Africa, and Western Australia and this has led regional countries 
such as China and Japan to expand their influence and presence in the Indian Ocean and 
the South Asian region.72 
The growing importance of these sea lines of communications linking the Asian 
economies through the Indian Ocean make the stability of the former U.S. strategic 
backwater much more prevalent to U.S. policymakers. Analysts continually cite figures 
68 Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips, “Rebalance to Where?: U.S. Strategic Geography in Asia,” 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 5, (2013), 95–114. 
69 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, (November 2011), accessed January 
12, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. 
70 Leon Panetta, “The US Rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific,” IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, (June 2 
2012), accessed January 12, 2014. http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/sld12-
43d9/first-plenary-session-2749/leon-panetta-d67b. 
71 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4, (July–August 2006). 
72 Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” 
Foreign Affairs 88, no.2 (March/April 2009), 16–29. 
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that between half and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments, half of containerized cargo 
and around one-third of bulk goods shipments travel across the Indian Ocean, most of 
them traveling through the Straits of Malacca.73 This economic thoroughfare increasingly 
link and merge the formerly separate areas of the Indian Ocean region and the rest of the 
Asia-Pacific. However, what does this mean for the rebalance and for U.S. maritime 
strategy in the Asia-Pacific? 
The idea of the Indo-Pacific74 vice Asia-Pacific is not a novel idea from the 
perspective of the most important U.S. entities responsible for the region to include 
United States Pacific Command and Seventh Fleet. Much of the Indian Ocean and its 
littoral states have traditionally been within their Area of Responsibility and as such, they 
already have the necessary personnel and experts and plans in place to react to a regional 
crisis. However, many other departments and groups still entail the area as a completely 
separate entity and thus treat the entire Asia-Pacific as two distinct groups for the 
purposes of foreign policy—East Asia and South Asia. The United States Navy is a very 
mobile and versatile and within one deployment can operate in East Asia, the South 
China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf utilizing forward bases to respond to 
most eventualities quickly. They must continue to perceive the two areas as linked which 
will allow the United States Navy to unify its efforts without compromising strategic 
versatility.  
3. Maritime Security Elements of the Rebalance 
The maritime security elements of the rebalance are some of the most visible and 
controversial aspects of the new policy. What physical changes the policy has or will 
enact over the next decade will directly affect the naval strategy of the United States and 
how it interacts in the region and as such, this section will outline what changes the U.S. 
military is likely to witness in the Asia-Pacific focusing on the maritime theater. 
73 Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help 
Themselves,” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 3, (May–June 2012), 385. 
74 Panetta, “The US Rebalance.” 
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The goal of the rebalance as demonstrated earlier is to ensure proper priority is 
given by the administration and the department of defense to the Asia-Pacific region 
upon the drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan. The planned security portion of the 
policy signals that the U.S. is determined to maintain and even increase its force levels 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region despite significant defense budget cuts. As such, the 
administration has taken steps to create a more dispersed presence of U.S. forces by 
increasing the basing and deployment arrangements also signaling the rising importance 
of the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, and Southeast-Asia along with the U.S.’s 
traditional focus on Northeast-Asia. Figure 2 provides an overview of the planned troop 
and ship deployments as modified by the Asia-Pacific rebalance which will be elaborated 
on. 
 
Figure 2.  Selected U.S. Troop Deployments and Plans as Modified by the 
Asia-Pacific Rebalance75 
75 Mark E. Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward 
Asia, CRS Report RL42448 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
March 28, 2012).  
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The Asia-Pacific rebalance involves a significant increase of military connections 
and cooperation with Australia, Singapore and the Philippines. In Australia, an agreement 
was signed to allow 2,500 Marines (a full Marine Air Ground Task Force) to rotationally 
deploy to Darwin for six months to conduct regional training with Australia and other 
partners. In addition, the two administrations are discussing the possibility for greater 
U.S. naval access to Australia’s Indian Ocean naval bases.76 Finally, an Australian ship, 
USS PERTH recently deployed with the George Washington Carrier Strike Group in the 
Western Pacific during routine operations for several months, one of only two times an 
allied warship operated in company with a U.S. strike group since World War II for 
extended operations.77 In Singapore, an agreement was signed to allow the forward 
deployment of four Littoral Combat Ships the first of which recently completed its first 
deployment to the region.78 In the Philippines, the United States is currently negotiating 
new military cooperation options to include a rotation of maritime surveillance aircraft, 
sending more U.S. Naval ships through Subic Bay, and to conduct more frequent joint 
exercises.79 
Specific steps announced by the United States Department of Defense and 
Administration leaders for the Navy include shifting aircraft carriers, intelligence and 
surveillance capabilities and unmanned aerial vehicles, from the Middle East supporting 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific region.80 In addition, they intend 
over the next several years to modify the global deployment of naval assets in order to 
locate 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific theater instead of the formerly 50-50 
split between the Atlantic and Pacific. This will involve an increase of 1 carrier, seven 
76 Ibid., 15–19. 
77 Kirk Spitzer, “Australia Chooses Sides—And It’s not with China,” Time Magazine, (May 6, 2013), 
accessed 21 January, 2014. http://nation.time.com/2013/05/06/aussies-choose-sides-and-its-not-with-china/. 
78 “USS Freedom set to complete its Maiden Deployment,” U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, accessed 
January 13, 2013. 
http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lcs1/Pages/USSFreedomSettoCompleteMaidenDeployment.aspx#.UulW
sPldWSo. 
79 Manyin, Pivot to the Pacific, 5. 
80 For specific security elements enacted through the rebalance see: Manyin’s Pivot to the Pacific? and 
Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability. 
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Aegis ships such as cruisers and destroyers, 10 Littoral Combat Ships and two 
submarines. Finally, the deployments of the ships in theater will be modified as well. 
In the future, U.S. deployments to the Asia-Pacific will be smaller and more 
versatile in nature. In contrast to their former reliance on large Cold War style bases in 
Japan, U.S. naval forces in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region will rely on 
rotational deployments while increasing the number and availability of access 
agreements, expanded training exercises, and military to military exchange with other 
countries. This includes continued partners in the region such as Australia, Japan, the 
Philippines and South Korea and Singapore, as well as new regional partners such as 
India, New Zealand, Vietnam and Indonesia. Examples of this can be seen through new 
defense cooperation agreements, increased defense dialogue, and joint military 
exercises.81 The possibilities of many of these changes are called into question however 
due to the fiscal constraints to be imposed over the next several years. 
The outlook on many of the changes enacted as a result of the rebalance is 
perceived as slim by many due to the potential fiscal constraints to be imposed on the 
Defense Department over the next several years. Secretary Hagel and other U.S. leaders 
however, have emphasized that reductions in defense outlays will not come at the 
expense of the Asia-Pacific rebalance. President Obama and U.S. military leaders in the 
Department of Defense’s January 2012, “Strategic Guidance,” pledge in addition to 
minimize cuts to the Navy, thus showing the importance of the maritime aspect of the 
entire theater and reflecting changing priorities.82 
B. NAVAL BASING AGREEMENTS AND THE REBALANCE 
Current U.S. policy aims to achieve distributed force throughout the Asia-Pacific 
in response to the regional security, economic and political environment. To maximize 
the ability of the Navy to remain present in the Asia-Pacific and act as a stabilizing force 
in the region it is imperative to have bases from which to operate in the area. Considering 
81 Sutter, Brown and Adamson, Balancing Acts, 12. 
82 Ashton Carter, “The U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia,” Speech at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, (Washington, DC: April 8, 2013) 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1765. 
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the nature of large scale main operating bases throughout Asia and the rising political and 
nationalistic sentiment which create significant issues surrounding possible infringement 
upon host nation sovereignty future access to this type of facility is questionable.  
The keys for future access in the Asia-Pacific will continue to be alliance and 
security assistance relationships, economic assistance relationships from the U.S. to the 
host country and regional support for U.S. policies such as ensuring regional stability, 
WMD anti-proliferation, anti-piracy and antiterrorism, the lack of which can produce 
significant anti-American sentiment. The purpose of this section is to discuss future 
basing strategies in the region to ensure U.S. naval presence in the future. Efforts to 
improve presence and access agreements include Singapore, Australia, and the 
Philippines considering their strategic importance and their political support for U.S. 
policy in the region. The other options in the area which will briefly be explored are 
logistic, training and access support from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. In 
addition, the importance of Diego Garcia and Guam will also be discussed as key U.S. 
military hubs. 
Singapore continues to be central to the forward presence of the United States in 
the Asia-Pacific. Since the early 1990s a SOFA agreement was established in between the 
two countries that would facilitate numerous contingency scenarios and a possible 
increase of U.S. forces depending on a future crisis regionally. These agreements were 
built off of the U.S. appearing to be indispensable to Singapore affairs both regionally 
and around the globe. Specifically, the stabilizing effect politically, economically and 
militarily that the U.S. has in areas that Singapore perceives as critical to its continued 
prosperity is central to their relationship.83 The “Singapore model,” as Calder calls it, 
represents an important cornerstone of future U.S. basing agreements throughout the 
Asia-Pacific. This model consists of preexisting legal agreements combined with 
logistical and infrastructure support, intelligence and government coordination, 
prepositioned equipment, repair and dry-dock facilities and a critical but minimal 
 83 See Seng Tan, “America the Indispensable: Singapore’s View of the United States’ Engagement in 
the Asia-Pacific,” Asia Affairs: An American Review, no. 38 (2011) 156–171.  
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presence of U.S. personnel to ensure its operation.84 This is also coordinated through a 
significant number of joint exercises and training to ensure positive and efficient mil-mil 
and mil-local government cooperation which also contributed to trust in between the two 
countries. In conjunction with hardened U.S. force projection facilities in Guam, Diego 
Garcia and Hawaii, future contingency access agreements, with allowances for 
infrastructure or political differences, should be applied to other countries in the future if 
the U.S desires to continue with significant forward presence operations. These access 
agreements need to rely on contingency operations such as training, security cooperation, 
and humanitarian assistance or disaster response scenarios as well as limiting the 
footprint of U.S. forces to ensure the least amount of political resistance abroad. 
Australia continues to have an enduring security alliance with the United States, 
but they continue to be wary of allowing significant U.S. forces which could be perceived 
as infringing on their sovereignty and independence, especially in light of their 
dependence on China for economic growth and investment. The recent agreement to 
rotationally deploy up to 2,500 U.S. marines to Darwin for training purposes is in 
partnership with Australian forces and not supported by American-only bases. In 
addition, the policy makers and the public in Australia continue to associate the U.S. 
military with costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which they were also leading 
contributors.85 The future of U.S. basing in Australia will continue to be joint basing 
agreements. Access to naval bases both in Darwin and Perth will continue, but there is 
significant pressure to prevent any permanent presence. It remains imperative that any 
future agreements with the Australia be based around political and security issues that the 
Australians can agree with, which include security cooperation on piracy, WMD 
proliferation and regional stability.86 
84 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 60–62.  
 85 Andrew Davies and Benjamin Schreer, “Whither US Forces? US military presence in the Asia-
Pacific and the implications for Australia,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (September, 2011), 
accessed October 22, 2013. https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/whither-us-forces-us-military-presence-
in-the-asia-pacific-and-the-implications-for-australia-by-andrew-davies-and-benjamin-schreer. 
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The Philippines represent another key area that has an opportunity for continued 
growth. The shift to the Asia-Pacific and the importance of the South China Sea and its 
surrounding countries to the economic and political interests of the United States places 
increased emphasis on forward presence in the area and the Philippines is a prime 
candidate for future access. The Philippines, specifically Subic Bay, offers unique 
advantages over other regional options for expanded basing agreements. First, Subic Bay 
operated as the largest U.S. overseas military base for decades during the Cold War and 
much of the infrastructure still exists. Secondly, there are several recent developments 
that will ease such an agreement. The continued successful cooperation between U.S. 
Special Forces and the Philippine government in the Southern Islands to combat terrorism 
has allowed for increased trust in between the two countries. In addition, the increased 
hostilities and the threat of China infringing on Philippine sovereignty continues to be 
central to regional political and security relationships. However, the new basing 
agreement will need to be a joint U.S.-Philippine venture to expand local infrastructure 
and, like the agreement with Singapore, consist of a very small footprint mainly focused 
on logistics support and repair.87 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam all have significant political and 
infrastructure issues which prevent further expansion of U.S. basing agreements in the 
near future. However, in order to increase the possibility of an eventual Singapore style 
contingency agreement for continued and assured access, significant steps and 
investments must be made to build confidence and trust in between the countries to 
ensure political sustainability. The United States can achieve this through efforts in three 
distinct areas to improve the perception of the United States within these countries’ 
governments, security establishment and their populace. The specific initiatives that need 
to be undertaken are: increasing bilateral military and defense partnerships with each 
nation; building comprehensive bilateral relationships to include political and economic 
ties; and advancing U.S. regional strategy through multilateral cooperation in accepted 
 87 Thomas J. Garcia, “The Potential Role of the Philippines in U.S. Naval Forward Presence,” 
(Master’s Thesis, United States Naval Post Graduate School, December 2001), accessed November 18, 
2013. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2001/Dec/01Dec_GarciaT.pdf. 
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regional forums such as ASEAN, ARF, and the EAS.88 Over time, these initiatives will 
improve the possibility that other regional countries will cause increased cooperation and 
access to the U.S. Navy in the event of regional crises. Until this is accomplished, 
anything other than basic training and access agreements is unlikely. 
Future access agreements as well as significant basing and logistic support 
throughout the region must be matched with significant, non-politically sensitive and 
hardened U.S. military bases in areas which the United States has complete control. 
These forward-operating hubs illustrate the trade-offs between political reliability and 
military utility that occur due to the inherent uncertainty in future scenarios in which 
local support for continued U.S. presence might not be assured. Guam and Diego Garcia 
can play host to significant prepositioned ordnance stores as well as permanent air and 
naval stations which are critical to contingency operations throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region. As a result of these strategic assets, in conjunction with other regional access 
agreements, the U.S. can maintain immense flexibility in response to future crises with a 
less provocative and less visible permanent presence within regional host-nations.89  
 
 
 88 Ely Ratner, Resident Power: Building a Politically Sustainable U.S. Military Presence in Southeast 
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V. FUTURE OF U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME STRATEGY 
A. SCENARIOS FOR FUTURE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY 
This section describes options for future force posture scenarios which reflect an 
array of potential variations for future U.S. maritime strategy. Utilizing the current 
security policy and goals of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region by looking at current 
DOD and naval strategy documents  already discussed throughout this thesis, it outlines 
the costs and benefits of several different future force posture scenarios with specific 
focus on their effects on the naval strategy goals of: conventional deterrence as well as 
their impact on regional confidence building measures and the Navy’s ability to assist in 
humanitarian disaster relief operations. 
The three force posture strategic scenarios that will be analyzed for the purposes 
of this paper are: 1) A steady policy and resource approach to U.S. Naval forces in the 
region assuming current changes enacted since the rebalance remain in place, 2) Further 
increase in U.S. naval resources in order to maintain local maritime dominance despite 
China’s naval procurement and growth, and 3) Limited and decreasing U.S. naval 
resources as a direct result of the fiscal constraints being levied against the DOD despite 
the emphasis on the rebalance. The strategic effects which will be discussed under the 
heading of each scenario will be conventional deterrence, impact on confidence building 
measures and the impact on U.S. response to humanitarian disaster relief operations. 
Each scenario’s feasibility will also be briefly analyzed.  
1. Steady State 
a. Summary of Approach 
The steady state approach is the intent to follow through with current and planned 
engagement in the region. The administration continues to generate more widely 
dispersed naval forces with their associated support and logistic structure throughout the 
Asia-Pacific. This includes various basing and access agreements to additional locations 
in Southeast Asia and Oceana while strengthening its current deployments to Singapore, 
our current logistics hub in the area. 
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The U.S. rebalance involves additional access and support agreements with 
Australia, Singapore and the Philippines. The current trend in Australia is to more closely 
align the two navies and they have pressed forward with plans for additional access for 
U.S. naval forces to Australia’s Indian Ocean naval bases.90 In Singapore, the Navy will 
continue to deploy an intended four Littoral Combat Ships with the first one having 
completed its first deployment to the area in December 2013.91 The Philippines and the 
United States are currently discussing additional military cooperation and access options 
to include the rotation of naval surveillance aircraft as well as additional access and 
logistic support agreement for U.S. naval vessels operating in the Asia-Pacific as well as 
staging additional joint exercises.92 
The U.S. Navy also intends to shift air and naval capabilities to include additional 
aircraft carriers and their associated supporting surface ships, intelligence and 
surveillance capabilities from other theaters to the region. It also plans on deploying 60 
percent of its total surface forces to the Asia-Pacific instead of its traditional 50 percent 
split in between the Pacific and Atlantic regions. This overall will include an aircraft 
carrier, seven destroyers, ten LCSs and four additional submarines.93 In addition, most of 
the Navy’s ballistic missile defense capable Aegis cruisers and destroyers will also be 
shifted to Yokosuka, Japan or Pearl Harbor, HI. 
To support the improved presence operations in the region the Navy will also 
modify its deployments to focus away from their reliance on traditional U.S. bases in 
Japan and will rotationally deploy to the South China Sea region. This will be 
accomplished through a drastically expanded number of naval access agreements, 
training exercises with other countries as well as additional engagement with regional 
90 Sutter, Brown and Adamson, Balancing Acts, 11–12. 
 91 Matt Burke, “Littoral Combat Ship’s Maiden Deployment marked by highs, lows,” Stars and 
Stripes, (December 11, 2013), accessed 15 December 2013. http://www.stripes.com/littoral-combat-ship-s-
maiden-deployment-marked-by-highs-lows-1.256985. 
92 Manyin, Pivot to the Pacific?, 9–11. 
93 Ibid., 12–14. 
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navies.94 Overall, the new approach seeks to avoid the political and fiscal difficulties that 
large scale U.S. infrastructure creates in host-nations. 
b. Effects on U.S. Naval Strategy and Missions 
Conventional deterrence in the region would be enhanced by current plans to 
diversify and disperse access agreements in the region. 
The increased number of forces and access as well as training agreements in the 
area will improve the ability of the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps to improve both the 
quality and number of confidence building measures throughout the Asia-Pacific. The 
Marine Corps units in Darwin will be used almost exclusively for this very purpose as 
long as regional contingencies do not cause their operational use. In addition, the low 
technology and flexible nature of the LCS as well as their forward deployments to the 
area will also improve the number of opportunities for improved maritime security 
training. 
Finally, the impact on humanitarian disaster relief operations over the long term 
will also be drastically increased capability. The addition of the MAGTF to Darwin and 
contingency access agreements around the region will improve the ability for U.S. forces 
to respond. However, in addition to the above mentioned troops, additional pre-
positioned stocks of wartime as well as aid supplies should be placed with regional 
partners in key positions around the area to also ensure adequate logistics support in case 
of a humanitarian disaster. 
c. Feasibility 
The long term feasibility of this possibility is positive. A majority of the rebalance 
involves significant distribution of already existing or planned forces with most 
investment in facilities and movements undertaken by the host nations. In addition, an 
observer would also have to take into the costs of not having the extra deterrence in 
theater or the additional capabilities which could drive up long-term costs due to delayed 
responses to regional crises assuming that, in the end, our willingness to engage in crisis 
94 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 12–13. 
 47 
                                                 
response does not also change. In addition, the widely distributed nature of this concept 
also allows it to be much more politically feasible due to negligible permanent U.S. 
presence in each host nation. Finally, the increased engagement in theater would lead to 
improved strategic dialogue throughout the Asia-Pacific with the U.S. involving new 
defense partners such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and India in future multi-lateral 
HA/DR, maritime awareness and maritime security agreements.95 Finally, the Obama 
administration and the Department of Defense have continued to emphasize that defense 
cuts will not jeopardize the Asia-Pacific rebalance and unlike many other domestic and 
foreign policy areas, it enjoys broad bi-partisan support in congress.96 
2. Increase of U.S. Naval Resources as a Result of Increased Regional 
Threat 
a. Summary of Approach 
Increasing the planned naval resources in the Asia-Pacific over those currently 
planned is unlikely due to the current budgetary environment. In this section however, we 
make the assumption that there are increased threat dynamics in the region which could 
lead to increased budgetary outlays for increased regional capability. This is not out of 
the realm of possibility in the near future due to recent regional maritime sovereignty and 
resource disputes between numerous states as well as North Korean unpredictability and 
WMD procurement. This approach takes the Asia-Pacific rebalance for the Navy with its 
emphasis on presence, distributed force posture and regional engagement and 
dramatically increases it using various methods. 
Future access agreements as well as significant basing and logistic support 
throughout the region must be matched with significant, non-politically sensitive and 
hardened U.S. military bases in areas which the United States has complete control. 
These forward-operating hubs illustrate the trade-offs between political reliability and 
 95 Patrick M. Cronin, “Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee: Achieving Strategic 
Rebalance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Center for A New American Security, (July 24, 2013). 
 96 Sutter, Brown and Adamson, Balancing Acts, 11–12; see also Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval 
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
RL33153 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 30, 2013).  
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military utility that occur due to the inherent uncertainty in future scenarios in which 
local support for continued U.S. presence might not be assured. Guam and Diego Garcia 
can play host to significant prepositioned ordnance stores as well as permanent hardened 
air and naval stations which are critical to contingency operations throughout the Indo-
Pacific region. As a result of these strategic assets, in conjunction with other regional 
access agreements, the U.S. can maintain immense flexibility in response to future crises 
with a less provocative and less visible permanent presence within regional host-
nations.97 These increased capabilities will put require significant infrastructure 
improvements on both islands. 
Secondly, an increased number of submarines and several Surface Action Groups 
consisting of several Aegis capable destroyers and cruisers as well as an Amphibious 
Readiness Group with its amphibious lift capability should be forward station in Guam. 
This would provide an immense improvement in presence operations, deterrence and 
regional interaction by decreasing the number of transit days per ship to a homeport from 
three weeks to a mere four days to arrive in possible crisis zones. In addition, with the 
subsequent movement of a MAGTF from Okinawa to Guam, it would also provide 
immediate amphibious transport capability for any regional contingency ranging from 
HA/DR to a large scale conflict in between belligerents.  
Finally, the aforementioned maritime logistics and access agreements to countries 
in theater should be expanded to ensure a small footprint of widely dispersed maritime 
prepositioned stocks. These stocks should however be focused on HA/DR equipment and 
supplies to ensure host nation support for their placement due to their non-conflicting 
nature. Additional “Singapore Model” basing and access agreements should also continue 
to be secured in order to achieve long term strategic parity. The “Singapore model,” as 
Calder calls it, represents an important cornerstone of future U.S. basing agreements 
throughout the Asia-Pacific. This model consists of preexisting legal agreements 
combined with logistical and infrastructure support, intelligence and government 
coordination, prepositioned equipment, repair and dry-dock facilities and a critical but 
 97 Lord, ed., Reposturing the Force; Erickson, Walter and Mikolay, “Diego Garcia and the United 
States.” 
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minimal presence of U.S. personnel to ensure its operation.98 This is also coordinated 
through a significant number of joint exercises and training to ensure positive and 
efficient mil-mil and mil-local government cooperation which also contributed to trust in 
between the two countries. In conjunction with hardened U.S. force projection facilities 
in Guam, Diego Garcia and Hawaii, future Singapore model agreements, with allowances 
for infrastructure or political differences, should be applied to other countries in the 
future if the U.S desires to continue with significant forward presence operations. 
b. Effects on U.S. Naval Strategy and Missions 
Conventional deterrence in the region would be enhanced by increasing the 
available naval assets both forward deployed and station in region through the expansion 
of Guam as well as an increased number of contingency access agreements for training or 
regional disaster response to include the positioning of various pre-positioned supplies 
while minimizing footprint to achieve long term political sustainability. 
The increased number of forces and access as well as training agreements in the 
area will improve the ability of the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps to improve both the 
quality and number of confidence building measures throughout the Asia-Pacific over 
current plans for the Asia-Pacific rebalance. The increased ARG capability and other 
maritime assets in theater will add much more capability for transporting assets around 
the theater for bilateral or multilateral training and exercises.  
Finally, the impact on humanitarian disaster relief operations over the long term 
will also be additional increased capability. The addition of the ARG to Guam in addition 
to a more widely dispersed range of prepositioned HA/DR supplies will drastically 
improve response time to these crises. 
c. Feasibility 
As stated in the introduction to this strategic scenario, the criteria for meeting the 
resource needs to achieve these outcomes would need an increased budget resulting from 
a perceived group of threats. Chinese military modernization poses increased risks in 
98 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 60–62.  
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terms of area denial and anti-access but Chinese intentions, although rather opaque, are 
not at present perceived as a threat to the U.S. or its allies. Should China or North Korea, 
which in itself continues to be completely unpredictable, move to threaten the interest of 
the United States or its allies in significant ways the current equilibrium would cause the 
U.S. to execute and expand into some of these contingencies to counter either threat. 
However, until then, current budgetary realities will not allow for the execution of this 
plan. 
3. Limited or Decreasing Naval Resources 
a. Summary of Approach 
The Department of Defense has been forced to face the stark reality of budget cuts 
proposed by both the Simpson Bowles act of 2011 and implemented by sequestration; 
however, it is important to note that this matches historic trends of post-war draw down, 
for example, the 1990s with the end of the Cold War resulted in a large decrease in 
Department of Defense outlays. In the end, massive government security spending is 
unlikely to be sustained indefinitely due to the growth of other concerns such as 
economic recovery. The effect on the Asia-Pacific rebalance, although staunchly argued 
as negligible by both the Department of Defense and the Obama Administration, will be 
significantly decreased global posture and flexibility.  
This section will outline possible impacts that significantly decreased resources 
will have on the Navy’s Asia-Pacific strategy. It will also argue for additional structural 
and strategic changes to U.S. naval strategy to minimize its negative impacts through 
additional cost savings such as modified deployments, forward basing and a reduction in 
force structure in order to reserve the overall goals of the U.S. maritime strategy.99 
Despite the increased emphasis on naval operations in the Asia-Pacific in the 
future, any changes in resources toward the Navy are modest at best due to the budgetary 
limits imposed by congress over the past several years. Despite decreased procurement 
over the last decade and limited numbers projected into the future, the Navy has been 
 99 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While 
Cutting The Defense Budget, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 
 51 
                                                 
able to maintain global presence with its current 286 major warships including 11 aircraft 
carriers, 11 large deck amphibious warships, over 50 nuclear submarines and 70-80 high- 
technology Aegis cruisers and destroyers. However, the fleet is almost half the size of 
Reagan Era levels with new global commitments despite the implosion of the Soviet 
Union and its global maritime threat. for presence operations and conventional 
deterrence, global engagement through bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises and training, 
maintenance of sustained combat ability for a large scale war while being able to operate 
in two smaller contingency operations, maintain a steady nuclear deterrent and ballistic 
missile defense capability, and the capacity to launch large scale HA/DR operations 
around the globe.100  
Despite all of these requirements and a declining amount of resources the Navy is 
maintaining 15 percent more overseas deployment time than it did a decade ago.101 Due 
to increased emphasis on these missions in the Asia-Pacific with the rebalance the overall 
likelihood of conducting the rebalance in an effective and efficient manner as planned 
with future budget constraints is unlikely. The following are recommendations which 
should be instituted to ensure that the primary goals of current U.S. maritime strategy in 
the Asia-Pacific are not compromised in the future. 
In recent DOD documents the goal of maintaining continuous deployments to the 
Mediterranean, Persian Gulf with increased presence operations and engagement in the 
Asia-Pacific is unlikely without significant changes in deployment structure.102 Similar 
to current patrol craft and mine-sweep forward deployments as well as intended LCS 
deployments, Aegis cruisers and destroyers should be stationed forward for longer 
periods of time and crew swaps should be instituted in order to improve their presence in 
theater. This would improve the current four-six month of on station time every two years 
by cutting out several months of transitioning time from home ports in the continental 
U.S. multiplied by the number of ships that are forward stationed to the area. It is 
100 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 4–10. 
101 O’Hanlon, Healing the Wounded Giant, 39–40. 
 102 For current goals for U.S. naval strategy, see: 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership; and “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices Fiscal Year 2014.” 
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projected that this would improve on station time by up to forty percent.103 However, 
significant challenges would need to be overcome in order to make this logistically but 
these are not insurmountable and in addition, the benefits outweigh any short-term costs 
while restructuring. 
In addition, as mentioned in earlier sections, expanding forward U.S. naval 
facilities and supporting infrastructure in Guam while negotiating and instituting 
additional “Singapore model” access agreements around with regional allies and partners 
would also allow for significant improvements and efficiencies in transit times and 
logistics support.104 These improved efficiencies would also allow for long-term cost 
savings despite initial infrastructure costs of around $2-3 billion dollars a year while 
improving forward presence and strategic flexibility. If necessary, the Navy could also 
continue to operate at current or slightly increased levels while decreasing the number of 
its forces slightly also increasing cost savings.105 
b. Effects on U.S. Naval Strategy and Missions 
Overall effect of this strategic scenario would be similar to the increased 
resources section but would sacrifice global presence and flexibility to achieve the 
rebalancing goals in the Asia-Pacific. 
c. Feasibility 
The long term feasibility of this possibility is positive. Current and future budget 
realities, absent a drastic change in strategic threat, will ensure that decreased overall 
resources will be available for the Navy despite the rebalance. A majority of this scenario 
involves currently planned regional deployments but incorporates the current long term 
trend of decreasing budgets and a push for overall savings and efficiencies. Politically, 
this is also the most feasible due to the positive nature of executing the rebalance with a 
more long-term oriented and realistic budgetary environment. Finally, due to continued 
103 O’Hanlon, Healing the Wounded Giant, 39–40. 
104 Ibid,  41–46. 
105 Ibid., 41–46. 
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broad bi-partisan support in congress that the rebalance receives, the initial political 
hurdles needed for infrastructure improvement in Guam with long-term savings in mind 
should be relatively easy to achieve. 
B. SUMMARY 
The Asia-Pacific will continue to remain important to the economic prosperity 
and national security interests of the United States. It is home to some of the world’s 
most important countries, which play host to extremely dynamic economies and 
militaries. In addition, significant reserves or natural resources as well as emerging 
security and stability crises will continue to drive future interactions in the region. The 
United States Navy, with is mobile and versatile nature and its ability to operate in 
international waters with little permanent regional footprint can help prevent, stabilize, or 
combat these future issues while maintaining U.S. presence in the region. 
This section analyzed several different possible scenarios focusing on current U.S. 
maritime strategic policy goals in the Asia-Pacific. Utilizing the current security policy of 
the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region by looking at current DOD and naval strategy 
documents it outlined the costs and benefits of several different future scenarios with 
specific focus on their effects on naval strategy goals of: conventional deterrence as well 
as their impact on regional confidence building measures and the Navy’s ability to assist 
in humanitarian disaster relief operations. With additional focus on partnerships and 
innovative ways to ensure forward presence and deterrence, including new capabilities 
and additional home-porting or deployment options, the Navy can continue to rebalance 
toward the Asia-Pacific in the future and continue to have a stabilizing effect on the 
region despite decreasing available resources. The goal of which is to sustain the 
influence and credibility of the United States throughout the Asia-Pacific region while 
preventing conflict, ensuring freedom of access to maritime resources and to protect the 
national security interests of the United States while safeguarding the global economy. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
The way ahead for the United States Navy in the Asia-Pacific is difficult to 
predict or understand without a firm foundation of knowledge of numerous aspects of not 
only the recent Asia-Pacific rebalance policy, but also the history of U.S. naval 
involvement and U.S. maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific Theater. This thesis utilized 
all of these areas to paint a more detailed picture of the new policy and its effects on U.S. 
maritime strategy. It also projected several future choices that the United States Navy can 
make in order to meet its stated strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The thesis began with the foundation of United States maritime strategy and the 
importance of modern naval diplomacy in shaping a country’s interactions around the 
globe were outlined to better comprehend the impact that the rebalance has on the United 
States Navy. Following the turn toward U.S. naval strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, we 
next analyzed the historic maritime involvement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific 
region. This was to show and emphasize the depth of involvement and the importance 
that the United States Navy has had historically and will continue to have on regional 
stability and prosperity. 
We next looked at the rebalance itself and its security and strategic elements 
which impacts U.S. naval strategy. Chapter IV provided several different strategic 
scenarios and strategic rationales that could be employed by the U.S. Navy and their 
effects on naval diplomacy. The importance of these two sections of the thesis was to 
project the current aspects of national strategy and the Asia-Pacific rebalance into the 
future. 
This thesis will now draw implications and policy recommendations from the 
previous sections consisting of substantive changes which directly reflect U.S. policy 
goals in the region in response to the rebalance. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The implications of the Asia-Pacific rebalance and its large maritime dimension 
continues to shape United States naval strategy. The rebalance is a multi-dimensional 
concept, but considering the increased importance that the Navy plays in regional 
political and economic stability through naval diplomacy, how the Navy shapes its 
current and future policies will continue to be central to any discussion. As shown 
throughout this thesis the United States Navy needs to continue its historic stabilizing 
role in the region to prevent a growth in inter-regional competition which could have 
negative global implications. 
The United States Navy can continue to enhance its presence and impact in the 
Asia-Pacific through several other avenues than previously discussed in order to meet the 
policy goals of the rebalance. These policy recommendations are to improve the political 
sustainability of U.S. naval forward presence, and to develop a new United States 
maritime strategy which reflects new geo-strategic realities.  
1. Maintain a Politically Sustainable U.S. Naval Presence 
The United States Navy in the future cannot rely on its own resources in order to 
achieve its stated goals of maintaining or improving the political, economic and security 
situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to stark budget and force structure reduction 
realities the United States Navy needs to rely more on regional partners to contribute to 
strengthening U.S. military and defense partnerships and to advance U.S. regional 
strategy through multilateral cooperation. This includes not only military operations and 
interactions such as training exercises or foreign military sales, but also includes 
additional multilateral diplomatic and economic ties.  
The current policy of the United States aims to have a more geographically 
distributed force posture in Asia while improving overall regional capacity in response to 
the ever evolving geo-political and security environment. These efforts include additional 
access agreements as well improving efforts aimed at political sustainability. The 
importance of long-term political support not only from governments but from the 
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populace of partner nations is fundamental to the U.S. regional goals.106 Below are 
specific steps that should be addressed for enhancing the political sustainability of the 
Navy throughout the Asia-Pacific.  
The United States Navy needs to ensure that that any new force posture initiatives 
receives the support of host nations while addressing its public’s perceptions to ensure 
that the agreements are shown to be mutually beneficial by pursuing a steady state 
approach that minimizes large scale initiatives which could be perceived as infringing on 
national sovereignty thus creating nationalistic tension or conflict. While pursuing these 
initiatives the U.S. will have to demonstrate a willingness to address key security 
concerns of regional allies and partners. This should include internal as well as external 
threats as well as nontraditional security challenges such as natural disasters or terrorism. 
If the U.S. demonstrates that they are filling and diminishing key capability gaps in these 
areas it would go a long way toward improving the regional perception that the U.S. 
primarily utilizes unilateral action and planning to accomplish its goals. This includes 
highlighting shared responsibility, improved partner capability and the importance of 
shared facilities and activities which improve the host nation without the perception that 
the United States is acting primarily for its own interests.107  
Improving bilateral and multilateral security relationships are also only part of the 
larger and perhaps more important comprehensive relationship to include diplomatic and 
economic ties. Increased regional exercises and force posture must be accompanied by 
additional increases in diplomatic and economic investments on the local as well as 
national level in order to improve overall regional perceptions. U.S. security policy 
decisions to include overall regional force posture need to be viewed in the context of 
active diplomacy and alliance management.108 The State Department should take more of 
a leadership role in the development of these security ties because they understand the 
large political and diplomatic context of any relationship. For example, the establishment 
106 Ratner, Resident Power, 5–6. 
107 Ibid., 17–18. 
108 Kurt Campbell and Celeste Ward, “New Battle Stations?” Foreign Affairs, (September–October 
2003) 95–103. 
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of the 2+2 dialogue and mechanism with the Philippines has helped to improve the 
quality of force structure discussions which have led to significant breakthroughs on the 
potential for shared facilities.109 
Finally, ensuring that the U.S. maintains or increases its participation in pre-
existing multilateral frameworks such as the various ASEAN forums will act as 
reassurance to regional allies and partners that its commitment to the region is strong and 
enduring. In order to accomplish this goal as well as to improve intra-region cooperation 
and capacity, consistent engagement cannot be overstated, the lack of which can cause 
the impression of a self-interested and opportunistic United States which can be seen in 
the regional perception of the insufficient U.S. support for the Philippines during the 
Scarborough Reef crisis as compared to Chinese challenges to Japan or Taiwan.110 Some 
recommendations to improve regional perceptions would be to articulate a baseline set of 
regional forums and activities in which the U.S. would participate at the highest levels 
consistent with regional partner’s participation. For example, the U.S. could include 
attendance of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to every Shangri-La Dialogue and the 
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus as well as the participation of the President for 
the annual East Asian Summit. Participation in these forums will also contribute to the 
acceptance and overall positive reception of U.S. naval presence throughout the region by 
improving the ability of U.S. officials to explain U.S. policy and intentions in public and 
private settings.111 
2. Develop a New U.S. Maritime Strategy 
The importance of a maritime strategy and the central role it plays to the 
prosperity of a maritime nation such as the United States was shown in Chapter II. It also 
analyzed the recent evolution of maritime strategy in the United States utilizing the most 
recent United States naval strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. 
The strategy however is lacking in many specific aspects and some would argue that it 
109 Campbell, “New Battle Stations,” 98. 
110 Ratner, Resident Power, 24. 
111 Ratner, Resident Power, 30. 
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cannot even be considered an actual maritime strategy. This must be resolved if the 
United States Navy is to adapt itself as an organization to modern geo-political realities 
and national policy goals.112 
Joint Publication 1-02, the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
defines strategy as, “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, 
and/or multinational objectives.”113 In addition, it must also directly correlate with and 
contribute to the National Strategy. Unfortunately, the “Cooperative Strategy” although 
discussing the strategic goals of the maritime services and their associate core 
capabilities, lacks any substantive discussion on the means required for their 
accomplishment or how specific resources, specifically budget, manpower, or force 
structure, will be aimed toward its varying priorities. In other words, without this 
information, it is much less a strategy than an overall strategic concept that is lacking any 
of the needed specifics needed to be complete. The Asia-Pacific rebalance and the current 
economic environment are a perfect opportunity to address these shortcomings by 
developing a new maritime strategy which addressed these issues within the context of 
the new environment. 
A new maritime strategy has been in development since 2011 among the higher 
echelons of the Pentagon and should be released over the coming months.114 Within 
various policy circles the new maritime strategy is seen as a much more forceful 
document than the previous 2007 strategy with its emphasis on cooperation and mutual 
security partnerships around the world while specifically avoiding mention of specific 
threats. The new maritime strategy contains an emphasis on possible threats to U.S. 
national security to include the growing anti-access and area denial capability around the 
globe as well as other nontraditional threats such as terrorism and climate change. In 
 112 Work and van Tol, A Cooperative Strategy, 1–4. 
113 Joint Pub 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, accessed 19 January, 2014. 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
114 Bryan McGrath, “What Should the New U.S. Maritime Strategy Look Like?” The National 
Interest, January 7, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/what-should-new-us-maritime-strategy-
look-9670. 
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addition, it does begin to develop its response to these threats utilizing new war concepts 
such as Air-Sea Battle.115 Finally, it also addresses new fiscal realities which will affect 
the strategic force posture of the Navy while addressing how its force structure and 
resources should be distributed in the future to reflect future budget reductions.116 
Pending its actual release, it seems to address many of the critiques leveled against its 
predecessor. Considering the close nature of the release date the possibility of debate is 
limited, however, offered below are some additional factors that need to be incorporated 
into the new maritime strategy in order for it to meet the goals enacted by the Asia-
Pacific rebalance.  
The new maritime strategy needs to prioritize among the many desirable policy 
goals; specifically, it needs to focus attention and resources on a few priorities which 
would accurately reflect the overall national strategy, in this case, the Asia-Pacific 
rebalance. The new maritime strategy needs to make specific choices in the pursuit of 
these objectives with the outlaying of resources directly connected to these goals. In other 
words, the strategy would lay out a future strategic outlook of the future and strive to 
provide resources and support to meet a realistic and achievable end-state. As a part of 
this the Navy needs to shape its force structure in the future to reflect these realistic goals 
and priorities. An example of modifying force structure to meet the goals of the Asia-
Pacific rebalance can be seen through the discussion surround the various strategic 
scenarios in chapter IV. 
Partnerships also need to continue to play a major role in the maritime strategy 
despite the new emphasis on specific threats around the globe. In the end, the goal of the 
U.S. Navy is to prevent large scale conflict by providing deterrence through its forward 
presence operations. A major part of these forward presence operations and its resulting 
deterrence value revolves around enduring security partnerships around the globe. This 
continued emphasis on increasing partnership capacity, specifically in the Asia-Pacific, 
115 McGrath, “What Should the New U.S. Maritime Strategy.” 
116 Christine H. Fox, “Remarks on the Current Affairs of the U.S. Navy,” 2014 AFCEA WEST 
Conference, San Diego, California, February 11, 2014. 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5369. 
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needs to also ensure a politically sustainable U.S. military presence to meet the goals of 
the Asia-Pacific rebalance into the future as discussed earlier in this section.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The United States’ foreign policy rebalance into the Asia-Pacific continues to 
have a dramatic impact on the United States Navy. Over the next several decades the 
importance of the Asia-Pacific and the central role that the Navy will continue to play in 
this essentially maritime oriented theater will continue to be a cornerstone of national 
strategy. Recent regional friction points persist: the rise of China, the instability of North 
Korea, maritime disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, climate change, 
natural disasters, piracy and drug and human trafficking all compete for U.S. naval 
resources. In addition, growing economic integration in this evolving region will continue 
to emphasize the critical role that stability in maritime trade, commerce, and resources as 
well as the continued prosperity and security of regional U.S. allies and partners are 
essential U.S. interests. To deal with these factors and goals, the United States Navy 
needs to adapt itself to ever changing circumstances which reflects the new focus of 
American interests and foreign policy. 
The information compiled in this paper can facilitate future regional United States 
maritime interactions, and, more generally, its future policy and strategic decisions in this 
pivotal region. Understanding the current nature of the United States Navy’s role and 
how it fits into the new policy can help to recalibrate the Navy’s goals and strategy in the 
future. The key will be to find ways to continue the high level of U.S. naval presence 
throughout the Asia-Pacific while continuing to grow regional capacity through 
cooperation and security assistance and training through various bi-lateral and multi-
lateral forums. To foster this successful growth and the role that the United States Navy 
will continue to play in the region adherence to the principles mentioned in this thesis 
will greatly increase the chances of success. The factors are: developing a new maritime 
strategy clearly delineating the nation’s policy goals and providing the specific resources 
necessary for their accomplishment, improving regional support and political 
sustainability, and increasing or modifying regional U.S. naval force structure in addition 
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to increasing the breadth and degree of access agreements and partnerships throughout 
the Asia-Pacific all will be mutually beneficial to the United States Navy in its adaptation 
to the new policy. 
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